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85 
ARTICLES 
VICARIOUS CHARITY: SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING 
PAULA DALLEY† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Corporate social responsibility” is now a corporate 
buzzword.  While at one time there was radical disagreement 
about the power of the corporation to act to benefit non-
shareholder constituencies, now, as far as the public face of 
corporate America goes, corporate social responsibility is 
standard operating procedure.  No corporation proclaims its 
social irresponsibility or declares its disregard for justice or the 
general well-being of the planet.  Many large corporations 
embrace their social obligations publicly.1  The business benefits 
of corporate social responsibility are increasingly recognized by 
management professionals.2  Harvard Business Review has a 
regular topic on Corporate Social Responsibility.3  In short, 
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) has gone mainstream.4 
 
† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Oklahoma City 
University School of Law. 
1 Cf. Roni Factor et al., Beliefs About Social Responsibility at Work: 
Comparisons Between Managers and Non-Managers Over Time and Cross-
Nationally, 22 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 143, 145–46 (2013) (discussing variation 
between nationalities). 
2 Devin Thorpe, Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will 
Move You To Act, FORBES (May 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/d 
evinthorpe/2013/05/18/why-csr-the-benefits-of-corporate-social-responsibility-will-
move-you-to-act. See also Daniel McGinn, Resisting the Lure of Short-termism, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2016, at 41, 43 (stating that Harvard Business Review’s “100 
Best-Performing CEOs in the World” includes a measure of “ESG,” which is 
environmental, social, and governance performance). 
3 See Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/topic/social-
responsibility (last visited July 8, 2018). 
4 Whether these public commitments to corporate social responsibility actually 
produce more socially responsible behavior is a different question. The point here is 
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Despite its ubiquity in corporate public relations materials, 
CSR still generates legal commentary defending the power of 
managers to do the right thing at the expense of corporate 
profits.5  A subset of CSR commentary argues that the social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church requires that corporations act to 
advance social justice.  Whether based on Church teaching or 
not, however, the CSR literature has a fatal weakness:  It ignores 
human agents. 
A corporation cannot act on its duties to the public because 
corporations as such can do nothing:  They act through human 
actors.  Even the board of directors has limited opportunities to 
do social good, because the vast majority of business decisions 
constituting corporate behavior are made by officers and other 
agents,6 not by the board.  The CSR literature, however, ignores 
the legal powers and duties of agents and employees altogether.  
Additionally, the Catholic social teaching strand of the CSR 
debate ignores the centrality of the human person to Catholic 
thought and fails to place moral responsibility on individuals who 
are free to make moral choices.  In sum, both legally and morally, 
the CSR debate is focused on the wrong people. 
The impact that non-director employees can have on both the 
business of the corporation and the common good of society is 
substantial.  In corporate criminal prosecutions, it is almost 
invariably those below top management, and certainly below the 
level of the board, who are blamed for the bad conduct.7  Such 
conduct may include making forbidden payments for business 
 
that, if corporate leaders are willing to publicly avow corporate social 
responsibility—and its benefits for business—it cannot be either unlawful or 
contrary to norms of appropriate corporate behavior. 
5 See infra Part I.A. While the literature does not distinguish between socially 
responsible actions that are potentially profitable and those that are expected to 
reduce profits, it is only the latter set of actions that is interesting. 
6 Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 271, 273 (2014). 
7 See Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 74 A.3d 612, 614, 618 (Del. 2013) 
(reversing a decision finding directors approved a marketing plan that violated the 
False Claims Act); see also Jean Eaglesham & Anupreeta Das, Wall Street Crime: 7 
Years, 156 Cases, and Few Convictions; Proceedings Against Individual Bank 
Employees Are Rare, and Authorities Have Had Difficulty Winning Cases, WALL ST. 
J. (May 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-crime-7-years-156-cases-
and-few-convictions-1464217378 (noting that the United States has brought 156 
criminal and civil cases against ten of the largest banks, resulting in charges against 
forty-seven people, but only one board-level executive). 
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referrals—also known as taking kickbacks8—failing to comply 
with anti-money-laundering laws,9 violating anti-trust 
provisions, mistreating investors, making false statements in 
issuing securities, or “robo-signing” foreclosure petitions.  In an 
egregious example, Volkswagen would have us believe that the 
decision to engineer around emissions regulations was taken at a 
non-executive level.10 
On the other hand, corporations are less quick to attribute 
socially beneficial acts to low-level employees.  Advertised CSR 
policies are usually endorsed by the CEO, but if a mid-level 
manager is responsible for the decision to make a polluting car, 
she also presumably has the power to decide to make an 
especially non-polluting car, or to ensure that the corporate fleet 
comprises only hybrid vehicles.11  Many decisions that implicate 
serious social policies are made at an even lower level: 
purchasing (including selecting suppliers), advertising and 
marketing (including sponsorships and endorsements), setting 
wages and prices, and adopting and implementing routine 
employment policies.  The opportunities for mid-level managers 
to engage in CSR are legion.  Unfortunately for CSR advocates, 
however, agency law, not corporate law, governs officers and 
other corporate employees,12 and corporate agents, as opposed to 
directors, are prohibited by current law from engaging in CSR 
unless they are authorized to do so, directly or indirectly, by the 
board:  The agent’s duty of loyalty prohibits the agent from 
engaging in any behavior that the agent believes will not advance 
the business of the principal—for example, profit-sacrificing 
CSR.13 
 
8 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963–64, 971 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
9 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006). 
10 Jack Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to Volkswagen’s Diesel 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/bu 
siness/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-timeline.html. 
11 Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV., 
983, 1000 (2011). See also Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Board Shareholder 
Value and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 88–90 (2015). 
12 See Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom ASDI Inc. v. Beard Research Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010). 
13 Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate 
Codes in the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603, 
604–05 (2011). 
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If corporations cannot engage in CSR because they do not 
really exist—and have no moral responsibility—and corporate 
agents are prohibited from engaging in CSR by agency law, who 
can act to improve corporate behavior?  The Church’s social 
doctrine provides an often-overlooked answer to this question:  
Individuals who are acting as principals, not agents, are 
responsible for ensuring that their actions are socially 
responsible.  Individuals act as principals when they make 
decisions about their own property, and it is those decisions that 
should be the subject of commentary and debate. 
This Article begins with a brief introduction to the CSR 
debate.  Part II describes the legal role of various human actors 
in the corporation, and Part III describes the legal restrictions on 
those actors’ socially responsible, but unauthorized, decisions.  
Part IV describes in some detail the relevant social teaching of 
the Catholic Church and explains that it does not apply to 
corporations or other corporate actors.  Part V then describes the 
appropriate application of Catholic social doctrine to economic 
actors. 
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. In General 
As noted above, while corporate CSR statements and policies 
are now standard operating procedures, the obligations of 
individual managers to make specific choices that prefer, in some 
way, the interests of others to the financial interests of 
stockholders are still hotly debated.14  While some commentators 
 
14 Recent articles on the subject include: Anastasia Telesetsky, Beyond 
Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility: Corporate Human Rights Obligations To 
Prevent Disasters and To Provide Temporary Emergency Relief, 48 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1003, 1016 (2015) (corporations have duties to support positive 
human rights); Delwin Lau, Note, Fixing International Labor Law: Corporate Social 
Responsibility, a Means or an End?, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 725, 728–32 (2015) 
(summarizing debate); Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on 
Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 
1667, 1669 (2015); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
Night-Watchman State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2015) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility] (discussing shareholder primacy); 
Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015) (summarizing competing theories); Daniel J. Morrissey, 
The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 353 (2015) (arguing that CSR is good business but that a federal law should 
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argue that managers may—or must—consider the public good, 
others argue that managers are obligated to pursue only 
profitability.  This so-called “shareholder wealth maximization 
norm” claims that managers—including boards of directors—are 
hired solely to produce profits for shareholders.15 
There is a legal aspect to this debate:  Are managers 
permitted by law to consider non-shareholder interests?  There is 
also a normative and practical aspect:  What should a manager 
actually do, assuming that she is permitted to consider societal 
interests to at least some degree?  The issue is rarely litigated, 
but most commentators believe that a board’s decisions relating 
to social responsibility will almost always be protected by the 
business judgment rule, which forbids judicial scrutiny.16  
However, unless the owners of the corporation agree otherwise, 
the managers of a for-profit corporation are obligated to operate a 
business and not a charity.17  This still leaves plenty of room for 
corporate philanthropy, whether through support of expressly 
charitable causes or through business decisions that are likely to 
confer significant benefits on outsiders without earning profits 
for the shareholders.18  Despite legal latitude to engage in 
 
also mandate CSR). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Law & Economics Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 331 (2014); Joseph J. Norton, 
Reflections on “In the Best Interest of the Corporation” and “Corporate Social 
Responsibility”: An Essay Honouring the Memory of Professor Alan R. Bromberg, 68 
SMU L. REV. 603 (2015) (summarizing current status of CSR movement); J. Haskell 
Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–17 (2012) (describing debate and 
relevant law). 
15 For a summary of the relevant positions, see Etsy’s I.P.O. and Public 
Corporations’ Obligations to Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligat 
ions-to-shareholders. Interestingly, a search for recent law review articles on 
“shareholder wealth maximization” produced many articles criticizing the doctrine 
as the prevailing view, but none espousing it. 
16 See Murray, supra note 14, at 12. A decision is protected by the business 
judgment rule unless it is uninformed, not in good faith, or involves a conflict of 
interest. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36, 40–41, n.91 
(Del. Ch. 2010). A decision that is uninformed, in bad faith, or made to advance the 
private interests of the decision maker would not, by any reasonable sense of the 
term, be a socially responsible one. 
17 See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 34; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919). 
18 Proctor & Gamble’s PuR water project is a useful illustration. Initially, P&G 
intended to sell its water purification system in developing countries. It spent $20 
million on research and development to make the product available to the very poor 
at an affordable price. Despite PuR’s superiority, consumers preferred cheaper 
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socially beneficial acts, there are still plenty of corporations that 
are operated in socially irresponsible ways that could benefit 
from stronger public or investor pressure to clean up their acts.19  
Public relations notwithstanding, the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm may still influence individual corporate 
leaders,20 and continues to be taught in elite business schools and 
law schools.21 
B. Corporate Social Responsibility and the Social Doctrine of the 
Catholic Church 
Some commentators have supported calls for CSR with 
precepts from Catholic social doctrine.22  That doctrine can be 
used to evaluate—and criticize—business practices,23 but many 
 
alternatives, and the project was unprofitable. P&G nevertheless decided to continue 
the project on a charitable basis—in other words, at a loss to its shareholders. See 
Denis G. Arnold & Andres Valentin, Corporate Social Responsibility at the Base of 
the Pyramid, 66 J. BUS. RES. 1904, 1908 (2013). 
19 Recent examples include Volkswagen concealing violation of emission 
controls, Nathan Bomey, EPA Accuses Volkswagen, Audi of Evading Emission Laws, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2015, 7:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars 
/2015/09/18/epa-accuses-volkswagen-audi-evading-emission-laws/72400018; HSBC 
laundering money for drug cartels and members of al-Qaeda, Alastair Jamieson, 
HSBC Allowed Money Laundering That Likely Funded Terror, Drugs, NBC NEWS 
(July 17, 2012, 5:52 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/report-hsbc-allowed-
money-laundering-likely-funded-terror-drugs-889170; GlaxoSmithKline bribing 
doctors, Matt Robinson, Glaxo to Pay $20 Million SEC Fine over Bribery in China, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 
6-09-30/glaxo-to-pay-20-million-sec-fine-over-bribing-chinese-officials; and Citigroup, 
JPMorgan Chase, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland manipulating currency 
markets, Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate-rigging, Pay More 
than $5B, USA TODAY (May 20, 2015, 7:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/st 
ory/money/2015/05/20/billions-in-bank-fx-settlements/27638443. 
20 See Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate 
Leadership, 95 HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2017, 50, 51; Murray, supra note 14, at 
17–19. 
21 See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1163 n.136 
(2012). 
22 See HUMANISM IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS: PERSPECTIVES OF THE 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION (Domènec Melé & Martin Schlag eds., 2015); Michael 
Miller, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of Business in Society, in 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE MARKET ECONOMY 333, 336 (St. Pauls Pub. 2d 
ed. 2014). For a summary of early debates, see Thomas J. Molony, Charity, Truth, 
and Corporate Governance, 56 LOY. L. REV. 825, 845–64 (2010). 
23 See generally Gerald F. Cavanagh, S.J. et al., Using Principles of Catholic 
Social Thought To Evaluate Business Activities, 10 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 155 
(2013); Oliver F. Williams, C.S.C., Is It Possible To Have a Business Based on 
Solidarity and Mutual Trust? The Challenge of Catholic Social Teaching to 
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commentators have taken the position that it “requires” that 
corporations operate so as to advance authentic human 
development.  These commentators focus on the corporation as 
the object of the Church’s teaching.  In their view, that teaching 
requires a recognition that the corporation exists for the 
advancement of the common good.24  For example, they argue 
that “Catholic Social Thought requires, at a minimum, that 
corporate law allow managers to act in a moral manner.”25  There 
should be a Catholic vision of the corporation that “emphasizes 
the corporation’s social responsibilities”;26 “a corporation cannot 
be content with seeking only the intermediate goods of, for 
example, efficiency or wealth creation alone.”27  The law should 
ensure “corporate awareness of . . . its social responsibilities”;28 
“the corporation . . . must be dedicated to the flourishing of its 
employees as human beings.”29  This strand of commentary also 
generally ignores the distinction discussed below between 
directors, on the one hand, and officers and other employees, on 
the other, by referring vaguely to “managers.”30 
 
Capitalism and the Promise of Southwest Airlines, 9 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 
(2012). 
24 See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 71 (2012) [hereinafter Colombo, Toward a Nexus of 
Virtue]; Leo L. Clarke & Edward C. Lyons, The Corporate Common Good: The Right 
and Obligation of Managers To Do Good to Others, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 282–
84 (2007); Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large Multinational 
Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 107, 114 (2007); MARC GUNTHER, FAITH AND 
FORTUNE: THE QUIET REVOLUTION TO REFORM AMERICAN BUSINESS 11 (2004). 
25 Molony, supra note 22, at 853. 
26 Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 181, 183 (2005) (emphasis added). Professor Stabile suggests that Catholic 
business people should be “encouraged to bring their faith into their business 
dealings,” id. at 201, apparently as a way to make corporations more socially 
responsible. 
27 Russello, supra note 24, at 125 (emphasis added). 
28 Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social 
Thought, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 561, 568 (2004) (emphasis added). 
29 Id. at 565 n.9. 
30 See, e.g., Molony, supra note 22, at 867 (“[m]anagement must direct the 
corporation”); Clarke & Lyons, supra note 24, at 275 (“Manager’s Dilemmas”); 
Sargent, supra note 28, at 572 (“managers’ responsibility”); Joseph S. Spoerl, The 
Social Responsibility of Business, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 277, 277 (1997) (“[M]anagers are 
agents of shareholders, that is, they are hired by shareholders . . . .”). Other 
commentators gloss over this issue through the use of the passive voice. See Sargent, 
supra note 28, at 570 (“corporations should be managed”). 
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More recently, commentators have brought Catholic social 
teaching to bear on specific business practices or specific industry 
segments.31  Meanwhile, another strand of commentary applies 
the Church’s social doctrine to justify both the existence of 
corporations and their pursuit of profits for shareholders.32  They 
argue that corporations, as communities organized for a common 
purpose, can advance the goals of Catholic social teaching by 
fostering—or at least providing a forum for—“fraternity, 
sympathy, fellowship, and cooperation,”33 and by putting into 
effect the principle of subsidiarity.34  They also oppose, in 
general, the view that Church teaching requires managers to 
reject the shareholder wealth maximization norm.35 
In sum, the application of Catholic social doctrine to CSR has 
assumed that the doctrine applies to the corporation as such.  
But the corporation is incapable of doing anything, good or bad; 
only humans can act in the world.  The Church’s teaching is 
directed at humans, and corporations are not subject to the 
Church’s Magisterium.  Moreover, social justice can only be 
accomplished by the acts of humans, because the Church’s 
definition of social justice requires that acts of justice be carried 
out with a state of mind that is not only unavailable to a non-
human in a direct sense, but also not vicariously available.36  As 
explained more fully below, the Church directs that Catholics live 
 
31 See, e.g., Cathy A. Driscoll et al., Nature Is Prior to Us: Applying Catholic 
Social Thought and Anabaptist-Mennonite Theology to the Ethics of Stakeholder 
Prioritization for the Natural Environment, 3 J. RELIGION & BUS. ETHICS 1 (2012); 
Ronald Paul Hill & Michael L. Capella, Impoverished Consumers, Catholic Social 
Teaching, and Distributive Justice, 67 J. BUS. RES. 32 (2014); Michael J. White, 
Homo Laborans: Work in Modern Catholic Social Thought, 58 VILL. L. REV. 455 
(2013); Ericka Costa & Tommaso Ramus, The Italian Economia Aziendale and 
Catholic Social Teaching: How To Apply the Common Good Principle at the 
Managerial Level, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 103 (2012); Mara Del Baldo, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Governance in Italian SMEs: The Experience of Some 
“Spirited Businesses,” 16 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2012). 
32 There are also those who argue that an application of Catholic social teaching 
to require corporate directors to consider non-shareholder interests violates the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm and current corporate law and theory. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. 
J. L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 10 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Bishops]. 
33 MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 16 (rev. ed. 
1990). 
34 See Bainbridge, The Bishops, supra note 32, at 25–26. 
35 See Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 14, at 41, 53–54; 
see also Sargent, supra note 28, at 582–83. 
36 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1929–31 (2d ed. 1997). 
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with caritas, not merely give to “charity.”37  A corporation cannot 
feel, or act with, caritas, and an agent cannot carry out caritas 
with someone else’s assets.  The link between Catholic social 
teaching and corporate social responsibility is a red herring. 
II. CORPORATE ACTORS 
A corporation is, of course, incapable of thinking, doing, or 
saying anything.  It acts solely through humans with distinct 
legal roles.  The directors set general broad-scale policy and 
monitor the managers, and the managers and other employees 
carry out corporate business.38  The shareholders—who may be 
humans only indirectly—are usually limited to choosing directors 
and rubber-stamping directorial decisions.39  However, 
shareholders have a significant private role when they choose to 
invest in a business venture at all. 
A. Directors 
By law, the voice of the corporation is the board of directors, 
which decides all corporate questions and is subject only to the 
state incorporation statute, the foundational documents of the 
corporation, shareholder voting rights, and its fiduciary duties.40  
It is the board’s role, for example, to decide that the corporation 
will add a significant new line of business.41  Because the board is 
not controlled by the corporation, it is not an agent of the 
corporation; rather, its powers are conferred by the corporate 
statute.42  Nevertheless, the board owes fiduciary duties to “the 
corporation and its shareholders.”43  The board acts solely as a 
body, and each individual director has no legal power to act on 
behalf of the corporation.44 
 
37 See infra Part IV. 
38 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.2.1, at 105–06 (1986). 
39 Id. § 3.1.1, at 93–94. 
40 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
41 See generally CLARK, supra note 38, § 3.2.1, at 105–06. 
42 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 200, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911). 
43 See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 
2014). 
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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Under corporate law, the board has broad power not only to 
adopt business policies but also to state corporate objectives.45  A 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation may, but rarely does, 
contain a statement about the corporation’s specific business 
purpose.46  In the absence of such a provision, corporate 
objectives are determined by the board.47  If the board chooses to 
alter course, it has the power to do so without shareholder 
consent, unless the change requires a structural change such as a 
merger or an amendment to the certificate of incorporation.48  
The board of a for-profit corporation cannot adopt a charitable 
purpose, because that would conflict with its charter.49  But 
choosing among potentially profit-making ventures50 and 
choosing social and other policies that govern the operation of 
those ventures is within the board’s power. 
While the board’s powers are extremely broad, the board’s 
actions are theoretically constrained by the board’s duties to the 
corporation and its shareholders.  The relevant legal question for 
CSR is the power of the board of directors, speaking on behalf of 
the corporation, to undertake or direct actions or policies that 
benefit others more than, or even at the expense of, the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Corporate law imposes duties 
of care and loyalty on the board of directors.51  However, the 
business judgment rule provides that a board’s decisions will not 
be scrutinized as long as the directors “acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
 
45 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
46 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
47 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
48 For example, in a celebrated 1989 case, Time Incorporated acquired Warner 
Communications, Inc., a company arguably larger than Time, and launched itself 
into the entertainment and cable business without a shareholder vote. See generally 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
49 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
50 See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 
619 (Del. 1974). 
51 In Delaware, a failure to act in good faith constitutes a breach of the duty of 
loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). The Model Business 
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) does not set forth a specific duty of loyalty, but requires 
that a director act “(i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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was in the best interests of the company.”52  Thus, a board may 
act to implement socially beneficial policies as long as the board 
believes, in good faith, that those policies will benefit the 
company. 
The law does not require that the benefits from a particular 
policy materialize in a certain a time frame,53 and it does not 
require that the board perform an extensive cost-benefit analysis 
for every decision.54  A board may, for example, cause the 
corporation to make charitable contributions because they will 
bring good will and favorable publicity to the company,55 as long 
as the contribution is reasonable in relation to the company’s 
size, and the board can articulate a benefit to the company.56  A 
 
52 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The MBCA provides that a 
director will not be liable for any decision unless the decision: 
[C]onsisted or was the result of: (i) action not in good faith; or (ii) a decision 
(A) which the director did not reasonably believe to be in the best interests 
of the corporation, or (B) as to which the director was not informed to an 
extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances; or 
(iii) a lack of objectivity due to [a conflict of interest]. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
53 See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (“The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate 
enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate 
goals.”). 
54 “The members of the board of directors or a board committee, when becoming 
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to 
their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a 
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). “There is no one way for 
‘becoming informed’ [in connection with the board’s decision-making function], and 
both the method and measure—‘how to’ and ‘how much’—are matters of reasonable 
judgment for the director to exercise.” Id. § 8.30 cmt. 2. 
55 See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (opining that the business 
judgment rule would protect decision by the board of Occidental Petroleum to spend 
$85.6 million to build and maintain a museum to house the art collection of its 
founder, Armand Hammer); Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 
878–79 (Del. 1970) (applying the business judgment rule to board’s decision to pay a 
tax “voluntarily”); Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404–05 (Del. 
Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
56 Charitable contributions are often used to protect or restore good will. In 
2013, the ten largest corporate donors, by dollars given, were as follows: Walmart, 
Wells Fargo, Chevron, Goldman Sachs, ExxonMobil, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, and Target. Sarah Frostenson & 
Megan O’Neil, 10 Companies That Gave the Most Cash in 2013, CHRONICLE OF 
PHILANTHROPY (July 13, 2014), http://philanthropy.com/article/10-Companies-That-
Gave-the/147651; see also Susanne Craig, Goldman Sachs, Buying Redemption, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 26, 2013, 2:21 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/26/goldman-sachs-buying-redemption (discussing Goldman Sachs’ large 
charitable gifts following the financial crisis). 
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board may also adopt a policy that benefits the community at the 
apparent expense of the corporation, as long as the board can 
point to potential benefits to the corporation.57  If the board were 
unable or unwilling to identify a benefit to the corporation, it 
would arguably not be acting in the good faith belief that the 
decision was in the best interests of the corporation, and the 
decision would, theoretically, be a breach of the duty of loyalty 
and not protected by the business judgment rule.58  In that case, 
the members of the board might be liable for losses suffered by 
the corporation as a result of the board’s action.59 
The “best interests of the corporation” standard imposes only 
a very limited constraint on the board.  The board decides what 
the “best interests of the corporation” are because those interests 
depend on corporate objectives.60  Because the board defines the 
corporation’s business, it can ensure that otherwise unprofitable 
measures benefit the “business.”61  When the CVS/Caremark 
board62 decided that the corporation’s stores would forgo $2 
billion in profit from tobacco sales, it renamed its pharmacy 
 
57 Some commentary implies that this is not legally accurate. See, e.g., 
Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 14, at 42, 53. My argument 
is that, in pursuit of the best interests of the corporation, directors have broad 
discretion to take actions that in fact benefit outsiders. 
58 The case law on this subject is so rare that the legal analysis is largely 
theoretical. However, one can explain the remarkable case of Dodge v. Ford, 170 
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), on this basis, because Henry Ford was unwilling to articulate 
the many ways in which his “semi-eleemosynary” operations were benefiting the 
company. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-
Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48 (2012); cf. 
Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 859, 882–83 (2015) (discussing personal, non-financial motive as bad 
faith). 
59 Because liability in such a case would be premised on a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, an exculpatory clause such as that permitted by § 102(b)(7) of Delaware 
General Corporation Law would not protect the directors. In addition, because the 
claim would be based on a breach of the duty of loyalty, the burden would 
presumably be on the directors to show that their decision was entirely fair to the 
corporation. Such cases are sufficiently rare that the applicable legal standards are 
uncertain. 
60 See Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business 
Associations, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 546–49 (2001); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (power of board). 
61 If such decisions are disclosed, shareholders who are unconvinced about the 
benefits of those policies can make their own decisions about the company’s likely 
long-term profitability. See GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 177. 
62 There are no sources that attribute this decision to the board, but such a step 
must have been approved, if not initiated, by the board. 
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division “CVS Health”—a step that emphasized the fact that 
forgoing tobacco profits was advancing the corporation’s 
business.63  Thus, while a board’s open avowal of permanently 
profit-sacrificing policies would potentially generate liability for 
the board, a board can, as a practical matter, direct many 
unprofitable CSR activities as long as it frames its decisions 
carefully. 
B. Shareholders 
Shareholders often represent an additional human 
participant in the corporation.64  Shareholders, as such, are not 
agents of the corporation and have no role in the operation of the 
business.  Even a controlling or sole shareholder operates an 
incorporated business, not as a shareholder, but in her capacity 
as president or CEO, if she is wise.65  The legal function of the 
shareholders is to elect directors and to approve or veto 
fundamental changes in the corporation that are initiated by the 
board.66  While the shareholders are beneficiaries of the duties 
owed by the board67 and other corporate agents, they are not  
 
 
63 See Tom Murphy, CVS Changes Name, Stops Tobacco Sales Early, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cvs-
changes-name-stops-tobacco-sales-early/article/2161585; see also Timothy W. Martin 
& Mike Esterl, CVS To Stop Selling Cigarettes: Pharmacy Chain Says Tobacco 
Products Don’t Fit with Push as Health-Care Provider, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 
7:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cvs-to-stop-selling-cigarettes-1391602647. 
64 Although most shareholders nowadays are institutions, those institutions 
almost always represent humans, either directly or indirectly. See Ronald J. 
Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive Corporate 
Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 266 n.145 
(2008) [hereinafter Colombo, Ownership, Limited]. Institutions themselves act 
through human agents, who are generally governed by agency law in the same way 
as corporate agents, although institutional investors may be organized as trusts, 
partnerships, limited partnerships or other unincorporated entities, and the law 
governing their managers may be slightly different from corporate and general 
agency law. 
65 A shareholder may become liable for the obligations of the corporation if she 
disregards the corporate form by commingling funds, ignoring corporate formalities, 
and otherwise acting as if she were a sole proprietor. See WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (2016) 
[hereinafter FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA]. 
66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
67 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 
92, 101 (Del. 2007). 
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their principals.68  When they sue to enforce those duties they 
must do so derivatively, on behalf of the corporation—the true 
principal.69 
The shareholders do have a role in the broader structure of 
the corporation, however.  For one thing, they—or their 
predecessors—provided the capital needed to establish and run 
the corporation.  Although in many jurisdictions even a majority 
of the shareholders cannot force the corporation to dissolve,70 
they can withdraw their financial support by seeking to sell their 
shares and thereby force down the market price of the corporate 
stock.  Eventually, the company’s liquidation value would exceed 
its market value and someone would come along and liquidate 
it.71  The shareholders elect directors, and even in a publicly 
traded corporation that occasionally makes a difference.72  In 
public corporations, shareholders vote on shareholder proposals 
and on executive compensation, and in all corporations 
shareholders vote on major transactions.73  Such votes 
occasionally have practical significance.74  Boards of public 
corporations also consult large shareholders informally.75  Thus, 
while shareholders—other than controlling shareholders—do not 
affect management of the corporation, they have a number of 
decisions to make on their own behalf as owners of shares.76 
 
68 Commentators often speak of the shareholders as the “principal” of the 
corporate board and corporate managers, see, e.g., Colombo, Ownership, Limited, 
supra note 64, at 265–66, but this is not legally accurate. See generally Paula J. 
Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism, 
8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 301, 310–14 (2008). 
69 See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, § 5729. 
70 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 275 (West 2010) (requiring unanimous 
shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (requiring 
board action). 
71 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 202 (11th ed. 2010). 
72 See id. at 189. 
73 See id. at 124–25. 
74 See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (2013). 
75 See id. at 1360–62. 
76 The “nexus-of-contracts” theory holds that the shareholders do not own the 
corporation, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991), but there is no question that the 
shareholders own shares, which constitute property in every legal sense. See 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, § 5096; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of 
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1423, 1433 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]. 
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C. Officers and Other Employees 
While the board has broad powers to determine business 
policy and practices, it cannot as a practical matter implement its 
decisions.  Rather, it acts by instructing, directing, empowering, 
and overseeing corporate agents.  Corporate officers, unlike 
directors, are agents of the corporation77 and are fully subject to 
the law of agency, as described below.78  Even employees who 
lack any authority to act on behalf of the corporation are agents 
for some purposes and owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty.79  While no 
one expects the board to run the company on a daily basis, the 
law does contemplate that the officers and other employees will 
be able to trace their authority directly or indirectly to a decision 
of the board.80  Thus, a middle manager who approves hiring 
additional personnel at a particular facility has the power to 
make that decision because the board authorized someone, 
probably the president, to take whatever actions were necessary 
to conduct business, and the president then assigned parts of 
that job to an underling, and so forth.  Corporate officers and 
other employees do not have the legal power to decide what 
corporate policy will be, unless the board has delegated that 
authority to the employee in question.81  While the board can, in  
 
 
77 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
78 See Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom ASDI Inc. v. Beard Research Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010). 
79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
Compare id. § 8.01, cmt. c. (discussing whether all employees owe duties), with 
Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment 
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 4 WIS. L. REV. 777, 810–11 n.193 (2011) 
(listing cases rejecting idea that employee is a true agent owing a duty of loyalty). 
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the 
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255 (2015) [hereinafter DeMott, Relationships of 
Trust]. 
80 The powers of some officers are set out in state incorporation statutes and in 
the corporation’s charter and bylaws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.03 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
81 Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 815–16 (2005) (noting that, where there is a controlling 
shareholder, she is the “manager,” and “[l]ower level managers should not enjoy 
discretion to sacrifice the corporation’s profits absent some indication of approval by 
the controlling shareholder of the corporate policy”). 
FINAL_DALLEY 7/27/2018  2:45 PM 
100 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 56:85   
effect, define its own fiduciary duties because it defines the 
corporate business, corporate agents may not—they are bound by 
the board’s decision about the best interests of the corporation.82 
III. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Since the primary actors in corporate enterprises are officers 
and other employees, it is the law of agency that is most relevant 
to the socially responsible or irresponsible behavior of 
“corporations.”  The Third Restatement of Agency divides an 
agent’s duties to the principal into duties of loyalty and duties of 
performance.83  Duties of performance include, in addition to the 
well-known duty of care, various duties requiring obedience to 
the principal and compliance with any contract between the 
principal and the agent.84  The duty of care requires that an 
agent act with reasonable “care, competence, and diligence” in 
the performance of the agent’s functions.85  If an agent chose one 
course over another because the preferred course was more 
socially responsible, the agent would breach his duties of 
performance only if the choice was careless or made 
incompetently.  The motive for the choice would implicate the 
duty of loyalty, not the duty of care.86 
 
82 Many such decisions will probably be delegated to the senior officers of the 
company. In such a case, they would have the same discretion the board would, 
subject to prior instructions from the board and subject to being overruled by the 
board. Officers may not be subject to the business judgment rule when making 
decisions, but at least one court has held that they are obligated to act in good faith 
in the best interests of the corporation. See Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. 
No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2379995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (also applying 
gross negligence standard to officers’ alleged breach of the duty of care). Cf. Lyman 
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, 
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 413–15 (2013) (arguing that the 
business judgment rule should not apply to officers). 
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
84 See id. §§ 8.07–8.12. 
85 See id. § 8.08. 
86 Id. § 8.08 cmt. b. In fact, an agent’s acting to further the interests of someone 
other than the principal is a classic breach of the duty of loyalty, not the duty of 
care. See id. § 8.01 cmt. b, illus. 2; see also King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 613 (Md. 
1985) (“In short, the agent is under a duty to serve his principal with only his 
principal’s purposes in mind.”). In King, which is the basis for the illustration in the 
Restatement, an attorney-in-fact made a gift of the principal’s property to the 
principal’s ex-wife. Id. at 610. Although the trial court held that the agent 
“negligently violated the fiduciary relationship,” the appellate court’s discussion—as 
well as the citation to the case in the Third Restatement—makes clear that the duty 
violated was loyalty. Id. at 611, 613. But see Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra 
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The duty of loyalty is determined by the scope of the agency 
relationship as created by the parties’ manifestations of 
consent.87  Thus, the agent is subject to a general duty to act only 
“in accordance with the principal’s manifestation of consent,”88 
and to a duty of loyalty to act “solely for the benefit of the 
principal” in connection with the agency relationship.89  The 
Third Restatement calls this the “general fiduciary principle” 
that defines the entire relationship between the principal and 
agent.90  The agent does not have unfettered discretion to 
determine what “the principal’s benefit” entails.91  The agent 
must act based on a reasonable interpretation of the principal’s 
manifestations92 to the agent.93  In the words of the Second 
Restatement, the principal’s purposes, “as manifested to the 
agent, constitute the benefit for which, as the agent should 
realize, the agency is created.”94  The agent must make “an 
honest assessment of what the principal would then wish the 
agent to do,”95 and that assessment must be based on the agent’s 
understanding of the principal’s objectives.96 
 
note 64, at 269 n.159, 282 (arguing that a board’s consideration of the common good 
raises duty of care concerns). 
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
88 Id. § 383. The Second Restatement includes the qualifier “[e]xcept when he is 
privileged to protect his own or another’s interests . . . .” Id. 
89 See id. § 387. 
90 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent 
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit . . . .”). The Third 
Restatement adds “loyally” and removes “solely” to clarify that it is acceptable for an 
agent to receive a benefit, in the form of compensation, from her activities. Id. § 8.01 
reporter’s note a. 
91 Cf. Linda S. Whitton, Understanding Duties and Conflicts of Interest—A 
Guide for the Honorable Agent, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42 (2013) 
(discussing the need for “substituted judgment” when an agent is acting under a 
durable power of attorney under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act). 
92 Corporate ethics codes and social responsibility statements, which are 
adopted by the board, can constitute “manifestations by the principal” for the 
purposes of guiding agents’ behavior. See Robert G. Kennedy, Virtue and Corporate 
Culture: The Ethical Formation of Baby Wolverines, 17 REV. BUS., Winter 1995/1996, 
at 10, 11. 
93 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
95 Deborah DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of 
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 322 (Andrew 
S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of 
Agency]. 
96 Id. at 324. 
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With respect to societal or other interests, the Second 
Restatement expressly states that “[i]n business enterprises, an 
agent normally has no authority . . . to conduct his principal’s 
business with a mind to the benefit of others.”97  Even if the 
agent works for a charitable organization, “the agent serves 
others only as a means of forwarding the principal’s objects.”98  A 
corporate employee-agent is bound by what the employee 
believes, based on manifestations by the “corporation,” to be 
consistent with corporate goals.  As noted above, the voice of the 
corporation is the board of directors or a senior officer to whom 
the board has delegated its authority to speak on any particular 
subject.  In a large corporation, the CEO—or one of her 
underlings—is likely to be the real decision maker on most 
matters, but the CEO is nevertheless under the control of the 
board of directors to the extent the board chooses to exercise that 
control.99 
Agency law does recognize that there are situations in which 
an agent’s duty to a higher authority trumps the duty of 
loyalty.100  Those situations are limited, however, to specific legal 
mandates, such as disclosure of information subject to a 
subpoena or to clearly articulated public policy concerns, such as 
reporting illegal behavior.101  The exceptions to the duty of loyalty 
have been kept narrow.102  The Third Restatement states that, in 
 
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). The 
illustration accompanying the text observes that a store manager “may be found” to 
have authority to make a reasonable donation to a local charity “to which merchants 
generally contribute,” in order to obtain or retain good will. Id. illus. 2. In other 
words, the act is still in the best interests of the principal. 
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
99 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
100 The Third Restatement notes that “an agent may in some circumstances be 
privileged to engage in conduct that may be adverse to a principal’s interests or that 
may in some other respect depart from the principal’s wishes.” Id. § 8.01 cmt. c. The 
circumstance noted is the agent’s right to keep secret the fact that the agent is 
planning to quit. Id. This right is a recognition that the agent has a right to make a 
living after the end of her employment. Without this recognition, anyone with a 
marketable skill, or who hoped to develop a marketable skill, would be deterred from 
serving as an agent. 
101 Id. § 8.05 cmt. c. 
102 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 191, 210 (2001) (noting that the author found no case law that directly 
addressed whether agents may vindicate moral and societal interests in violating 
their obligations to their principals); Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1009–10 
(Wash. 1989) (en banc) (rejecting claim that public policy protected employee who 
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some instances, “general social interests circumscribe the agent’s 
duties to the principal,” but it identifies only the whistleblower 
cases as examples of such an exception to the duty of loyalty.103  
Many courts even refuse to excuse whistleblowing where the 
reported behavior does not constitute a violation of law.104 
Unless one of the few narrow exceptions applies, an agent 
must act according to the principal’s wishes, whether or not the 
agent agrees with the principal.  The agent must comply with the 
principal’s manifestations, reasonably interpreted, even if the 
agent believes that doing so is not, in fact, in the principal’s best 
interests.105  Thus, there is no room for an agent to act outside 
the stated purpose of the agency for the benefit of either the 
common good or the principal’s unacknowledged moral well-
being.106  In agency law, the principal’s right to control the agent 
and define the purpose of the enterprise is virtually sacrosanct,107 
which reflects the fact that the principal owns the enterprise, and 
all the resources at the agent’s disposal belong to the principal. 
Consider a simple example.  Alpha operates a business as a 
sole proprietor, and Bravo manages one of Alpha’s locations.  
Bravo elects to purchase recycled bags for the store, although 
they are slightly more expensive.  Bravo has acted loyally to 
benefit Alpha in this decision only if Bravo reasonably believes, 
based on Alpha’s manifestations to him, that buying—and paying 
more for—the recycled bags will benefit the business as Alpha 
sees it.  Thus, Bravo may purchase the bags if Alpha has 
 
disclosed confidential information despite employee’s “arguably good faith belief in 
the righteousness of her conduct . . .”). 
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
104 See generally Dicomes, 782 P.2d at 1007–09 (collecting and summarizing 
cases); Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jewelry, Inc., 868 P.2d 1266, 1282 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1993), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 121 (1994) (Hartz, J., dissenting) (same). 
105 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). In 
the organizational context, the agent must obey the instructions of his superiors in 
the organization even if he believes those instructions do not effectively advance the 
goals of the organization. See DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency, supra 
note 95, at 325; see also id. at 327 (“[Agent] is not free to disregard what [Agent] 
knows about [Principal’s] preferences, even if [Agent] believes them to be 
mistaken.”). 
106 See DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency, supra note 95, at 329–30 
(“[E]ven well-motivated departures from [Principal’s] known preferences are 
inconsistent with [Agent’s] position as [Principal’s] representative,” even in 
situations where the agent’s choice does not reduce the economic benefit to the 
principal). 
107 See id. at 321. 
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indicated that she wants her business to be operated as 
sustainably as possible, or if Alpha has previously indicated an 
interest in sustainable products.  If Bravo believes that using the 
recycled bags would benefit the business, but Alpha has 
previously indicated her dislike of recycled products, Bravo may 
not buy the bags.  Bravo is also not permitted to buy the bags if 
he subjectively believes there is no business reason to do so—in 
other words, if he does not believe it would benefit Alpha.  The 
fact that using the recycled bags has numerous benefits for 
society is simply irrelevant to Bravo’s duty.108  The higher-
authority exception to the duty of loyalty does not apply because 
Bravo is not under any superior legal duty to buy recycled bags, 
and Bravo’s act cannot fall under a whistle-blowing exception 
because it presumably does not prevent Alpha from violating a 
statute, regulation, or clearly stated public policy. 
A real-world example of this principle recently occurred in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, where several city bus drivers were fired for 
distributing free transit passes to people in need.109  The drivers 
were allowed to issue passes “for improved customer service,” but 
the city charged them with embezzlement for printing and 
distributing nearly $38,000 in free rides.110 
It has been suggested that a principal—at least a corporate 
principal—knows that her agents will have their own moral and 
ethical beliefs, that the principal assumes the risk that an agent 
will act in accordance with generally accepted moral principles 
(“GAMP”),111 and that an agent acting in accordance with GAMP 
does not breach the duty of loyalty.112  This is incorrect as a 
matter of law unless the GAMP in question has the force of 
 
108 In the unlikely event of a suit, the remedy here would probably be for Bravo 
to reimburse Alpha for the difference in the cost of the bags. That is, of course, what 
Bravo should have done in the first place. 
109 The actual facts are unclear. Several drivers are suing the city, alleging they 
were fired with discriminatory intent and not for distributing free passes. They 
allege that other drivers also distributed passes and were not disciplined. See Ginnie 
Graham, Fired Tulsa Bus Drivers Sue in Federal Court, Alleging Race 
Discrimination, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/c 
rimewatch/fired-tulsa-bus-drivers-sue-in-federal-court-alleging-
race/article_c4b1597e-7ef2-5cdf-a458-23db128afdf4.html. 
110 The case was dismissed because the drivers lacked criminal intent. See id. 
111 See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–61. 
112 There is a certain absurdity in this argument: loyalty is itself a high moral 
value, and the ninth circle of Hell, according to Dante, is inhabited not by thieves, 
murderers, heretics, or profiteers, but traitors. 
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positive law, or the agent reasonably believes that the principal 
has authorized the agent to apply GAMP in the business 
context.113 
It has also been argued that the law should be changed to 
permit an agent to take actions that do not benefit the principal 
but are in accordance with socially desirable behavior and 
GAMP.114  There are at least two reasons why such a change in 
the law would be unwise.  First, one purpose of the strict duty of 
loyalty is to encourage a principal to delegate activities to agents 
and to limit agency costs.115  A GAMP exception would be 
sufficiently large and vague that it would increase the risks for 
principals and force principals to deliver elaborate and yet 
nonetheless unavoidably incomplete instructions about situations 
likely to involve moral choices.116  Second, the GAMP exception 
would make a difference in two situations—where the principal’s 
moral choice would differ from the agent’s, and where the agent 
must make a moral decision without guidance from the principal.  
In the former case, the GAMP exception would privilege the 
agent’s view over that of the principal with respect to an aspect of 
the principal’s business, an outcome utterly contrary to every 
tenet of agency law.  In the latter case, current law requires that 
the agent act based on the agent’s reasonable interpretation of 
the principal’s wishes.  If the agent legitimately believes that the 
principal’s moral values are coincident with his own, then there 
is no problem.  If the agent believes that the principal’s moral 
values differ from his own, then the agent is actually in the 
former, conflict-of-value situation and must respect the fact that 
his principal, not he, owns the enterprise. 
It is said to be unrealistic117 and dangerous118 to require that 
an agent check her morals at the door of her workplace.  Such 
“role morality” permits a person to separate herself from the 
morality of her act and to engage in acts she would never take on 
 
113 See DeMott, Relationships of Trust, supra note 79, at 1266. 
114 See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–65. 
115 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1039, 1042–44 (2011). 
116 A principal is free, under current law, to express binding moral preferences 
to the agent but is not required to do so in order to prevent the agent from imposing 
the agent’s moral choices on the principal. 
117 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 76, at 1439. 
118 See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 48–49. 
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her own behalf.119  To counter that phenomenon, goes the 
argument, the law should enable and encourage agents to take 
moral account of their actions.120  But in the context of an agency 
relationship that is asking the wrong question.  The agent must 
make moral choices based on her role in the workplace, as 
elsewhere in the world.  But, while an agent is entitled to, and 
must, act morally in conducting her own business, she is not 
permitted to pass the costs of her “morality” on to a third person.  
Morality includes loyalty and respect for another’s property.121  
Bravo may purchase recycled products himself, but he cannot 
force Alpha to pay for them.  That would be no moral choice at 
all.  The difficult moral choice for the agent is not in deciding how 
to spend other people’s money, but in deciding how to use her 
own assets, including her skills, and thus even in deciding what 
job to take.122  Many, perhaps most, incidents of corporate  
 
 
119 See id.; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern 
Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
477, 513–22 (1995). It has also been argued that the structure of corporate law, 
combined with common business practices, makes corporate employees more likely 
to engage in wrongful behavior. See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 
24, at 52–55; Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of the Firm, 3 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 309, 323–29 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1652–55 (2002); see also PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER 
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 132 (1931) (observing that agents of a corporation can use 
that form to conceal or justify severe abuses as well as petty injustices). 
120 See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–65; Mitchell, 
supra note 119, at 526–27. 
121 Even if corporate property does not belong to the corporation—because the 
corporation is only a nexus of contracts—it certainly does not belong to the agent. 
122 Professor Colombo notes that the borrower of a car is not expected to sacrifice 
a life to protect the car. See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 55. 
This observation is inapposite. Even if the borrower of the car were an agent, rather 
than a mere bailee, the duty of loyalty would not require her to commit homicide to 
protect the principal’s property. The exceptions to the duty of loyalty would cover 
such a situation. More to the point, if the owner of a car bails her car to an employee 
to deliver flowers to a client, the employee may not have the car converted to flex-
fuel at the owner’s expense; she may not remove two roses from the bouquet and 
give them to a sad homeless person; and, if the client is a crime boss, she may not 
deliver the flowers to someone else that she believes is more deserving. She may, 
however, refuse to make the delivery and take the consequences. 
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wrongdoing are attributable to dishonest individual conduct,123 
and requiring workers to abide by, rather than ignore, their 
fiduciary duties may have a salutary effect on conduct.124 
IV. THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
While most CSR commentators ignore the law of agency, the 
commentators who argue that the social doctrine of the Catholic 
Church supports or mandates CSR misunderstand and misapply 
Church doctrine. 
A. Teaching and Evangelization 
The Church is made up of all the faithful, living and dead.125  
The Magisterium of the Church—its teaching authority—is 
therefore directed at, and binding upon,126 the faithful.  The 
Church identifies its two-fold pastoral activity as, first, helping 
individuals to discover and love Christ, and, second, encouraging 
the faithful to live that love in their lives and in the world.127  The 
Church’s mission to preach the Gospel entails announcing moral 
principles and making judgments on human affairs,128 which is, 
 
123 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 
386, 396–98 (1981). 
124 Petty theft, shirking, disregarding quality controls, and falsely enhancing 
one’s own performance metrics at the expense of another, for example, are both 
unethical and breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
125 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1267 (2d ed. 1997). The Code of 
Canon Law explains that the “Christian faithful” constitute the “people of God” by 
virtue of their baptism, and they are “called to exercise the mission which God has 
entrusted to the Church.” CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.204 (Canon Law Society of 
America trans., 1983) [hereinafter CIC-1983]. For the communion in the Church of 
those who have died, see SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOGMATIC 
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH LUMEN GENTIUM ¶ 49 (1964) [hereinafter LUMEN 
GENTIUM]. 
126 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1269 (2d ed. 1997); PONTIFICAL 
COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE 
CHURCH ¶ 80 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
127 See COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 525 (“[T]o discover the truth and to 
choose the path that they will follow” and “to bear witness with a spirit of service to 
the Gospel in the field of social activity.”); see also PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER 
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS ¶ 48 (1971), [hereinafter OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS], 
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 265, 283–
84 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT]. 
128 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 5 (1991) 
[hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 127, 439, 443; CIC-1983, supra note 125, c.747, § 2. 
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in essence, its social doctrine.  The basis for the Church’s 
teaching on social issues is its evangelization mission, 
proclaiming the “truth of Christ’s love in society.”129  As Pope 
Francis has made clear, the “New Evangelization” proclaimed by 
Pope John Paul II130 connects causally to the Church’s social 
teaching.131 
The Church’s “social” teaching is not solely about social and 
economic justice; rather, it is Catholic teaching, and only a 
commitment to the truth of the Gospel makes Catholic social 
justice possible.132  The Church’s social doctrine, like all its 
teaching, seeks to “help[] man on the path of salvation.”133  It is 
only in light of this goal that the Church concerns itself with 
other things;134 this is its “primary and sole purpose.”135  Catholic 
social doctrine therefore includes spiritual goals that are 
inseparable from its concern for justice and temporal conditions.  
The social and economic development that the Church promotes 
is “integral human development,” which considers the whole 
person, including her relationship with God.136  Catholic social  
 
 
129 BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS IN VERITATE ¶ 5 (2009) 
[hereinafter CARITAS IN VERITATE]. 
130 There are numerous texts on the New Evangelization. A new emphasis was 
officially declared in BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC LETTER PORTA FIDEI ¶ 4, (2011). A 
complete lengthy papal exhortation appears in EVANGELII GAUDIUM, infra note 131, 
while the U.S. bishops have also published on the subject. See generally UNITED 
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Disciples Called To Witness: The New 
Evangelization 3 (2012). 
131 See FRANCIS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGELII GAUDIUM ¶ 17 (2013) 
[hereinafter EVANGELII GAUDIUM]; see also id. ¶¶ 15, 24, 49; UNITED STATES. 
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The New Evangelization and Social Justice, 
http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/new-
evangelization-social-justice.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2018); COMPENDIUM, supra 
note 126, ¶ 7. 
132 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶¶ 2–6; see also EVANGELII 
GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 199 (noting that the Church’s “authentic option for the 
poor” differs from every other ideology because it is based on love). 
133 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 54. 
134 See id. 
135 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 69. 
136 See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON 
THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 10 (1965) [hereinafter 
GAUDIUM ET SPES]; CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 79; CENTESIMUS 
ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 41. 
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doctrine is not merely concerned with making life better for 
humans; it is about making humans themselves more fully 
human in recognizing their ultimate destiny.137 
Because of this core value of the entire—spiritual—human 
person, the Church teaches that those working for social justice 
must work not merely for the common good, but out of love.138  In 
the words of Pope Benedict:  “Charity is at the heart of the 
Church’s social doctrine.  Every responsibility and every 
commitment spelt out by that doctrine is derived from charity 
which, according to the teaching of Jesus, is the synthesis of the 
entire Law.”139  The “charity” [“caritas”]140 that is at the heart of 
the Church’s social doctrine is “love received and given”141—
received from God and given to God and man.  Love of one’s 
neighbor without caritas—that is, without a link to the love of 
God—is merely “morality,” not Christianity,142 and any attempt 
to build up the world without God leads to “desertification.”143  
And caritas is not only linked to love of God,144 it comes from love 
of God.145  Consequently, the Church calls those who are to 
 
137 See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 41; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 
128, ¶ 54. 
138 See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 165 (“God’s saving 
love . . . precedes any moral and religious obligation on our part.”). Those acting for 
the common good for some reason other than love of God and neighbor are perhaps 
people “of good faith” who can assist the faithful in some aspects of their work, see 
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 57, but they are not living in accordance 
with Catholic social teaching. See JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN 
TERRIS ¶¶ 158–60 (1963) [hereinafter PACEM IN TERRIS], reprinted in CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 131, 157. 
139 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 2; see also EVANGELII GAUDIUM, 
supra note 131, ¶ 37 (stating that the first value of moral teaching is “faith working 
through love”) (quoting Galatians 5:6 (New American)). 
140 In the English-language version of CARITAS IN VERITATE, the word used is 
“charity.” In the Latin version it is “caritas”; in the German version it is “Liebe.” I 
will use the term caritas to refer to this concept throughout this Article. 
141 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 5. 
142 See BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EST ¶ 14 (2005) 
[hereinafter DEUS CARITAS EST]. 
143 EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 86. 
144 See OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 17. 
145 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1822 (2d ed. 1997); LUMEN 
GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 42; EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 183; 
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 78; DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 142, 
¶¶ 1, 17, 18, 20; JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER MATER ET MAGISTRA ¶ 257 (1961) 
[hereinafter MATER ET MAGISTRA], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 127, at 84, 125; SYNOD OF BISHOPS, Justice in the World (1971) [hereinafter 
JUSTICE IN THE WORLD], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, 
at 288, 293–94. 
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effectuate its social doctrine to undergo a personal conversion to 
“transcendent love,”146 which will in turn lead them to take 
responsibility for injustice.147  Development and socioeconomic 
progress require that the truth of Christ’s love be itself loved and 
demonstrated.148  Society cannot be made more human until 
caritas prevails in human relationships;149 justice alone cannot 
bring about the “union of minds and hearts” which is the basis 
for real stability.150  In other words, Catholic social doctrine calls 
the faithful to advance the integral human development of all 
peoples, because the faithful love God. 
B. Specific Precepts of the Catholic Social Doctrine 
The Church’s social doctrine provides criteria for judging the 
morality and justice of political, social, and economic institutions 
and systems, as well as general guidance about the nature of a 
just society.151  Although the three aspects of human life—
political, social, and economic—cannot be separated for practical 
purposes, this Article considers only the precepts of Church 
doctrine relating to the economy and, more specifically, business. 
While the Church has not endorsed a specific economic 
system or set of policies, its social doctrine is quite clear about 
the economic conditions that advance integral human 
development: an attitude of solidarity between all people,152 
worker participation in enterprise,153 just wages,154 full 
 
146 OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 45 (“Otherwise, . . . the most 
revolutionary ideologies lead only to a change in masters.”); see also id. ¶ 48 (issuing 
a “call to action” preceded by a “personal conversion”). 
147 See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 127; OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, 
supra note 127, ¶ 48. 
148 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 5; see also JUSTICE IN THE WORLD, 
supra note 145, at 310; JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI 
SOCIALIS ¶ 40 (1987) [hereinafter SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS], reprinted in 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 395, 424. 
149 See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVES IN MISERICORDIA ¶ 14 (1980) 
[hereinafter DIVES IN MISERICORDIA] (referring to “merciful love”). 
150 QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 137. 
151 See Robert G. Kennedy, Corporations, Common Goods, and Human Persons, 
4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
152 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1941 (2d ed. 1997). 
153 See PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶¶ 18, 20; MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra 
note 145, ¶ 82. 
154 See MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 71. 
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employment,155 and a more equitable distribution of goods among 
men, among other things.156  More generally, economic life should 
be inspired by Christian principles.157  The economy in all its 
facets should respect the dignity of the whole person because the 
economy is human activity.158  Of course, the economy is not an 
independent actor; it is made up of individual decisions and 
decision makers, and so the concrete prescriptions of the 
Church’s social doctrine relating to the economy are directed at 
how humans behave in their various economic roles: owner and 
worker.159  The Church’s social doctrine also addresses the role of 
businesses in general and corporations specifically. 
1. Ownership of Property 
Many of a person’s economic roles involve decisions about the 
use of her property, and Catholic social doctrine is quite specific 
about the obligations of the faithful in that regard.  First of all, 
the Church emphasizes the doctrine of the universal destination 
of goods:  God gave creation to man in common, and, although we 
have adopted a system of private property for a variety of 
primarily consequentialist reasons, those property rights are 
limited by duties reflecting the claims of the common good.160  
This limitation has a number of consequences.  First, and 
obviously, it is wrong to use one’s property to seek to increase 
one’s wealth by unjust or unlawful means.161  Second, one must 
give one’s property to those in need.162  Caritas may require that 
 
155 See JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION CHRISTIFIDELES 
LAICI ¶ 43 (1988) [hereinafter CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI]. 
156 LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 36; see also CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2403–06 (2d ed. 1997). 
157 QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 136. 
158 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶¶ 45, 65. 
159 See id. ¶¶ 37, 65, 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; see also 
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 141 (“[T]he apostles of the industrial and 
commercial world should themselves be employers and merchants.”). 
160 See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 69; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 
128, ¶ 43; JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 14 (1981) 
[hereinafter LABOREM EXERCENS], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 127, at 352, 378; PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 22; MATER ET MAGISTRA, 
supra note 145, ¶¶ 19–20; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶¶ 44–52; LEO 
XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOVARUM ¶¶ 4–14, 19 (1891) [hereinafter RERUM 
NOVARUM], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 14, 14. 
161 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 43; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra 
note 119, ¶ 134. 
162 See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 160, ¶ 22. 
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one give not only from one’s superfluous income, but out of one’s 
own needs as well.163  Pope Paul VI exhorted each person to 
examine his conscience:  “Is he prepared to support out of his own 
pocket works and undertakings organized in favor of the most 
destitute?  Is he ready to pay higher taxes so that the public 
authorities can intensify their efforts in favor of development?”164  
The obligation must be satisfied from one’s own resources.165 
Third, one should not be too attached to material wealth and 
property.  One should have “interior freedom” with regard to 
one’s goods and abilities.166  Observation of the “right order” of 
values will lead the faithful to lives “permeated with the spirit of 
the beatitudes, notably with a spirit of poverty.”167  Owners 
should use their goods with moderation, “reserving the better 
part for guests, for the sick and the poor.”168  Individuals must 
beware the dangers of consumerism, which can prevent a person 
from truly “being.”169  Consumer choices also have a moral 
dimension and should be made accordingly.170  “[E]very economic 
decision has a moral consequence,”171 and created goods 
themselves can be used to advance general progress.172 
Fourth, decisions about savings and investment, and the 
productive use of property in general, must consider the common 
good.173  A reasonable return on investment is just, but property 
 
163 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 
136, ¶ 69. Loving one’s neighbor calls for sacrifice and perhaps suffering, which 
unites the actor with Christ and serves to build up the body of Christ on earth. See 
PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER POPULORUM PROGRESSIO ¶ 79 (1967) [hereinafter 
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, 
at 240, 253. 
164 POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 163, ¶ 47; see also OCTOGESIMA 
ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 23 (“[T]he more fortunate should renounce some of 
their rights so as to place their goods more generously at the service of others.”). 
165 See PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 35; MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 
145, ¶ 121. Canon Law emphasizes this, and notes that clergy should be paid enough 
so that they can give from their personal income. CIC-1983, supra note 125, c.222, 
§ 2. Canon Law requires that the faithful support the Church, with time and talent 
if not with cash. 
166 OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 45. 
167 GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 72. 
168 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2405 (2d ed. 1997). 
169 SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 148, ¶ 28. 
170 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra 
note 128, ¶ 36. 
171 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 37 (emphasis omitted). 
172 See LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 36. 
173 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH ¶ 2405 (2d ed. 1997). 
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must be used “in accordance with faith and right reason.”174  
Because of the importance of meaningful work to the 
development of the complete person,175  Catholic social doctrine 
encourages investment in activities that create employment 
opportunities satisfying the requirements of solidarity.176  
Investment has other potential moral implications of course.  For 
example, Pope Benedict XVI specifically recognized the 
existence—and danger—of social choice investment funds; the 
faithful must consider whether financial opportunities respect 
“the inviolable dignity of the human person and the transcendent 
value of natural moral norms.”177  Persons with assets engaged in 
business are similarly bound.  Business owners must “respect 
concretely the human dignity” of their workers and strive to 
operate their businesses so as to promote the family.178 
In general, the faithful should avoid using their property in 
ways that increase inappropriate inequalities in wealth.179  One 
must recognize that one’s possessions are not entirely one’s 
own—they are “common in the sense that they should be able to 
benefit not only him but also others.”180  In short, the general 
obligation to act with caritas applies to a person’s use of her 
property as to all her actions.181 
 
 
 
 
174 QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 136. 
175 See infra notes 184–193 and accompanying text. 
176 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; see also QUADRAGESIMO 
ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 51 (recommending such investment as a use for superfluous 
income). 
177 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 45. The Pope notes that “ethical” 
financing might mean anything, including “decisions and choices contrary to justice 
and authentic human welfare,” and that one needs a “sound criterion of 
discernment.” Id. 
178 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶¶ 344–45. 
179 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 32. 
180 GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 69. 
181 Cf. SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 148, ¶ 47 (exhorting everyone to 
“implement . . . by the use of their resources . . . the measures inspired by solidarity 
and love of preference for the poor”). 
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2. Work 
Catholic social doctrine also focuses substantial attention on 
work and workers.182  Work must be more than simply a means to 
live.183  It has an essential spiritual component:  It contributes to 
the spiritual good of the laborer and contributes to the work of 
Christ.184  Every person has a duty to work,185 but work is defined 
broadly as any human activity.186  Work is essential to the worker 
for a number of reasons.  Ideally, one fulfills one’s calling through 
work;187 in any event, one is obeying God’s commandment by 
working.188  One also develops oneself as a person through 
work.189  Through work, one contributes to the good of others; not 
only one’s co-workers and the enterprise in which one works, but 
also one’s family and society in general.190  A worker shares in 
God’s work of creation191 and, also, because work invariably 
involves some kind of toil, in Christ’s suffering on the cross.192  
Work provides, moreover, an opportunity to live with caritas.193 
3. Business 
In addition to work and ownership of property, which are 
themselves business activities,194 Catholic social doctrine has 
specific observations and prescriptions related to businesses.195  
Businesses should produce “useful goods and services,”196 create 
 
182 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 160, ¶ 3 (“[H]uman work is a key, 
probably the essential key, to the whole social question.”) (emphasis in original). 
183 See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 36; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra 
note 119, ¶ 135. 
184 See MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 259; LABOREM EXERCENS, supra 
note 160, ¶¶ 24–27. 
185 See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 67. 
186 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 160, ¶ 1. The Pope goes on to explain 
that work is “transitive”—through work, one directs oneself toward an external 
object. Id. ¶ 4. 
187 Id. ¶ 6. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. ¶¶ 24–26. 
190 See id. ¶ 16. 
191 See id. ¶ 25. 
192 See id. ¶ 27. 
193 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 41; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 
136, ¶ 67. 
194 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 41. 
195 As discussed below, the use of “business” or “a business” as the grammatical 
subject of a sentence can present difficulties, especially when referring to morality or 
intentionality. 
196 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338. 
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wealth for their owners and contracting parties,197 produce high-
quality goods and services, and promote the well-being of their 
employees.198  On the other hand, businesses should avoid 
corruption, the irresponsible destruction of natural resources, 
and the exploitation of workers, especially in developing 
nations.199  Businesses by their nature serve a social function by 
“creating opportunities for meeting, cooperating and the 
enhancement of the abilities of the people involved,”200 and profit 
is not to be pursued without regard to its social and human costs.  
The “demands of the common good . . . must also be borne in 
mind when assessing the rate of return due as compensation to 
the company’s management, and as interest or dividends to 
investors.”201 
However, Catholic social doctrine is about more than 
improving the social value of business.  It includes exhortations 
consistent with the Church’s evangelical mission.  The lay 
faithful are to be apostles in their roles as employers and 
merchants,202 and a business must not neglect “the authentic 
values that bring about the concrete development of the person 
and society,”203 presumably including the spiritual values 
described above.  While these observations purport to relate to 
businesses, they are in fact about the behavior of humans.  Those 
actors are variously “business owners and management,”204 
“employers,”205 “those responsible for business enterprises”206 and 
“[a]ll those involved in a business venture.”207  Vaguer terms, 
such as “individuals and private enterprise,” are often used as 
 
197 See id. 
198 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36. 
199 See id. ¶ 43. 
200 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338; see also CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra 
note 128, ¶ 43 (describing business as a “society of persons” where integral human 
development “promotes the greater productivity and efficiency of work itself”). 
201 MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 81 (emphasis omitted). 
202 OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 48. 
203 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338 (emphasis omitted). 
204 Id. ¶ 344. 
205 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1941 (2d ed. 1997); CONGREGATION 
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND 
LIBERATION LIBERTATIS CONSCIENTIA ¶ 83 (1986) [hereinafter LIBERTATIS 
CONSCIENTIA]. 
206 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2430, 2432 (2d ed. 1997). 
207 COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 339. 
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well,208 but, when economic and financial institutions create 
injustice, “it is not the instrument that must be called to account, 
but individuals, their moral conscience and their personal and 
social responsibility.”209 
C. Catholic Social Doctrine and Corporations: Vicarious Charity 
Because Catholic social doctrine calls for the faithful to bring 
caritas to the world, it cannot apply to corporations.  Clearly an 
institution cannot actually act with caritas, which has an 
emotional component.  Nor can humans somehow act so that 
caritas is imputed to the corporation.  It is impossible for a 
faithful member of the Church to carry out the Church’s mission 
or advance Catholic social justice, which requires a commitment 
to the Gospel, on someone else’s behalf—that is, as an agent—
unless the principal shares the agent’s spiritual motivation.  The 
concept of representation or substitution has an important place 
in Catholic theology,210 but a relationship with God must arise 
from a free response and acceptance in which a person “commits 
his whole self freely to God.”211  A person must act without 
external pressure; “no man has the capacity to force internal 
compliance on another.”212  It follows that a person must feel 
caritas personally; the caritas of one person cannot be imputed to 
another.213 
 
208 See, e.g., LIBERTATIS CONSCIENTIA, supra note 205, ¶ 85; see also CATECHISM 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2433 (2d ed. 1997) (“[S]ociety should, according to 
circumstances, help citizens find work and employment.”). 
209 CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 36; see also OCTOGESIMA 
ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 48. 
210 Most fundamentally, Jesus took upon himself the sins of the world and 
therefore, to oversimplify grossly, redeemed us vicariously. CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1992 (2d ed. 1997). Moreover, Christians can participate in the 
redemption of others through prayer. See Jacques Servais, S.J., Postscript, in HANS 
URS VON BALTHASAR & ADRIENNE VON SPEYR, TO THE HEART OF THE MYSTERY 
OF REDEMPTION 129–30 (2010). One’s own works “enable us to collaborate in the 
salvation of others” by building up the Church. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH ¶ 2003 (2d ed. 1997). 
211 PAUL VI, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON DIVINE REVELATION DEI VERBUM ¶ 5 
(1965). 
212 PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 48; see also DEUS CARITAS EST, supra 
note 142, ¶ 16. 
213 Cf. Charles J. Chaput, O.F.M. Cap., “We Have No King But Caesar:” Some 
Thoughts on Catholic Faith and Public Life, 58 VILL. L. REV. 371, 377 (2013) (“The 
obligation to seek and serve the truth belongs to each of us personally . . . . We can’t 
ignore or delegate away these personal duties to anyone else or any government 
agency.”). 
FINAL_DALLEY 7/27/2018  2:45 PM 
2017] VICARIOUS CHARITY 117 
Unlike caritas itself, an agent’s good works can be imputed 
to the principal, as when a person directs another to distribute 
alms on her behalf.  However, neither the love nor the works can 
be imputed when an actor is using another person’s goods 
without that person’s consent, because that by definition is not 
an act of caritas at all.214  For one thing, the obligation of caritas 
requires sacrifice of self; sacrificing another would not have any 
spiritual value for either the actor or the unwitting donor, and it 
would not serve as a very convincing witness of the Gospel.  
Additionally, causing another person to suffer, even for the 
common good, would violate other fundamental moral principles, 
including respect for the rights of others215 and, in some cases, 
fidelity to one’s obligations.216  Thus, vicarious caritas217 could 
exist only when one person used his own property or other gifts 
out of love for God and neighbor and offered that love and 
sacrifice for the benefit of another’s soul.  But that is not CSR. 
V. PERSONAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
If Catholic social doctrine has little to say to corporations 
and corporate, or other, agents, how can it relate at all to the 
world of business?  The answer is that it relates to individuals in 
their business activities, but only to the extent that they are 
acting on their own behalf, as principals, and not as agents.218  
This is true because only individuals are capable of the caritas 
that enables true social justice,219 as the Church sees it.  In the 
 
214 One may not engage in charity with another person’s goods. See ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 8 (2d ed. 1920) (1266–1273) 
(“[H]e that is under another’s power must not give alms of anything in respect of 
which he is subject to that other.”). If the principal directs the agent to give alms, 
the caritas—and presumably the property—is the principal’s; it is not imputed from 
the agent. 
215 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2407–08 (2d ed. 1997). This 
would be treating another as a means, rather than as an end in herself. See id. 
¶ 2407. 
216 See id. ¶¶ 2410–11. 
217 This author has not been able to identify any such doctrine in an 
authoritative source. Cf. id. ¶ 2010 (“Moved by the Holy Spirit . . . we can then merit 
for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase 
of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life.”) (emphasis added). 
218 This focus is consistent with Catholic moral teaching, which focuses on the 
actor and the effect of sin on the actor, not on the harm caused by the sin. See M. 
Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 303 (2000). 
219 See supra Part IV.C; see also BENEDICT XVI, MESSAGE FOR LENT (2013). 
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world of business, corporations are not the only principals; 
owners of property are also principals when they are dealing with 
their own property.  Thus, Catholic social doctrine applies to 
business owners, investors, and consumers, who are also the vast 
majority of the human beings in the United States. 
In 2016, almost 150 million Americans were employed;220 
only about 2.6 million of those can be categorized as senior 
management.221  While almost 25 million people work in 
“management, business, and financial operations,”222 almost 27 
million are in “service” occupations such as “health care” support 
or “food preparation,” 33.5 million are in sales, office, and 
administrative positions, almost 14 million are in “natural 
resources, construction, and maintenance,” and almost 18 million 
are in production and transportation occupations.223  At the risk 
of overgeneralizing, over 93 million employees are likely to have 
little significant decision-making authority at work.224 
Significant numbers of Americans own their own businesses, 
however.  In 2013, there were 24.3 million “nonemployer” 
establishments.225  In 2016, thirteen percent of households owned 
 
220 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY tbl.11 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2016.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018). 
221 These are “chief executives” and “general operations managers.” Id. 
222 This category includes food service managers, education administrators, 
claims adjusters, event planners, and accountants. Id. 
223 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, QUARTERLY CENSUS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (2016), https://data.bls.gov/cew/apps/table_maker/v4/tab 
le_maker.htm#type=12&year=2016&size=0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9&agg=23&supp=1 (last 
visited July 8, 2018). 
224 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY supra note 220. Nor are workers likely to have close contact with the owners 
of the business. Although there are relatively few large workplaces, 87.2 million 
people worked in workplaces with more than 20 employees. Id. at tbl.12. While 
meaningful participation in work is a goal of the Church’s social doctrine, a 
significant proportion of the lay faithful in the United States probably do not have it. 
On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal reports that more than three-quarters of 
surveyed employees say they have no desire to move up in their organizations 
because they are happy and fulfilled in their current job. Sue Shellenbarger, Would 
You Refuse a Promotion To Stay in a Job You Love?, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013, 
11:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732434850457860976 
2637492762. 
225 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES: NONEMPLOYER STATISTICS 
BY LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION FOR THE U.S. AND STATES (2015), 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=NE
S_2015_00A1&prodType=table (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). These are people working 
alone, such as independent contractors. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NONEMPLOYER 
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all or part of a business;226 as of 2010, the last year for which data 
was reported, ninety-four percent had an active role in the 
business they owned.227  Far more invest in businesses run by 
others:  By various accounts, about half of American households 
invest in the stock market, directly or through mutual funds, 
retirement plans, and similar vehicles.228  It is in these roles—as 
workers and owners—that individuals can freely act to advance 
social justice, and it is to individuals in these roles that the 
Church speaks. 
A. Issues in the Workplace 
It is difficult to imagine more than a day or two passing in 
the life of the average worker without an opportunity for the 
practice of personal caritas,229 and even ordinary workers will 
occasionally, perhaps often, be presented with thorny moral 
issues and will be called upon to make decisions that implicate 
Catholic moral and social teaching more directly.  Workers in fact 
have asked questions such as: 
 
 
 
STATISTICS, https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0500.html (last visited Dec. 2, 
2017). 
226 Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 21 box 6, 28 box 9. 
227 Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL., June 2012, at 47 tbl.9, 51–52. 
228 Id. at 24; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All 
But Older, Higher-Income, GALLUP NEWS (May 24, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/ 
poll/211052/stock-ownership-down-among-older-higher-income.aspx. 
229 Pope Francis’s encyclical, EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, suggests 
that the faithful must overcome suspicion of others and abandon their defensive 
attitudes. ¶ 88. They should learn to suffer in Christ when they are unjustly 
attacked or met with ingratitude, id. ¶ 91, and tolerate the nuisances in life, id. ¶ 92. 
A person with caritas prays for someone who makes her angry, id. ¶ 101, and serves 
as a peacemaker in her community, id. ¶ 239. The faithful must respect migrants 
and those of other faiths, id. ¶ 253, must stand firm in faith when faced with 
setbacks and frustrations, id. ¶ 277–80, and must not try to appear better than 
others, id. ¶ 271. In fact, Chapter V of EVANGELII GAUDIUM is a set of vivid 
instructions for the laity. The Pope clearly expects that they will be carried out in 
the workplace, producing “nurses with soul, teachers with soul, politicians with 
soul.” Id. ¶ 273. 
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  May a mechanic or clerical employee continue working for 
a business that cheats people?230 
  May a customer service worker or desk clerk implement 
evasive or devious policies?231 
  May employees allow an employer’s defects or wrongdoing 
to hurt others?232 
  May salespeople push products on which extra 
commission is paid?233 
  May an employer hire undocumented workers in violation 
of the law?234 
Such questions suggest that employees understand the 
implications of the duty of loyalty better than many legal 
scholars do.235 
Questions such as those listed above implicate the moral 
doctrine of “cooperation with evil.”  Put very simply, participating 
in an objectionable act is always forbidden if the cooperator 
shares the wrongful intent of the primary actor; this is “formal 
cooperation.”236  When a person’s act contributes to the wrongful 
act of another, and the cooperator foresees that her action will 
help the wrongdoer but does not intend that the wrong occur, the 
cooperator’s act is “material cooperation.”237  In cases of material 
cooperation, the permissibility of the act is determined on a case-
by-case basis.  Thus, in some circumstances an employee may be 
able to do her job even if she knows that the enterprise in which 
she works will commit some wrongful act, as long as she does not 
intend that act.238  Material cooperation “can be immoral, 
however, because it can lead to sharing bad intentions, lead 
others into sin, impair one’s witness to relevant moral truth, 
and/or be unfair to those injured by the wrongdoing to which it 
contributes.”239  Relevant factors include how badly the employee 
needs the job, whether the employee’s resignation is likely to 
 
230 See GERMAIN GRISEZ, 3 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL 
QUESTIONS 543, 544 (1997). Professor Grisez has also been asked questions about 
the morality of tax evasion and theft of employer resources. 
231 Id. at 548, 551. 
232 Id. at 555. 
233 Id. at 576. 
234 Id. at 735. 
235 Cf. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 38–39 (arguing that 
low-level employees do not face moral issues). 
236 See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 872–74. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. at 876–86. 
239 See id. at 546–47. 
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hinder or advance the evil behavior, and whether the employee 
has the opportunity to ameliorate the effects of the bad behavior 
by staying employed.240 
Employers, or their attorneys, can, and probably do, provide 
instruction on the duty of loyalty as part of their regular 
employee training, but they probably do not provide guidance for 
employees who face personal moral dilemmas because of the 
demands of their employers.  Oddly, the Church does not provide 
much formal guidance on this subject either.241  While legal 
scholarship is unlikely to be more available to low-level 
employees than moral theology, lawyers and legal commentators 
could help employers establish policies that recognize and 
encourage loyal, moral behavior on the part of employees.  Such 
policies might reduce the likelihood that employees will engage 
in harmful, disloyal, and immoral acts.  Moreover, a greater 
recognition of individual moral responsibility in general might 
improve the business’s culture of behavior.242 
 
 
240 See, e.g., id. at 543–48. Material cooperation: 
[I]s licit when the action is good or indifferent in itself; and when one has a 
reason for doing it that is both just and proportioned to the gravity of the 
other’s sin and to the closeness of the assistance which is [thereby] given to 
the carrying out of that sin.  
Id. at 876 (quoting St. Alphonsus Ligouri) (alteration in original). 
241 In contrast, the Church has many resources available to help the faithful live 
according to Church teaching in their family lives and as citizens. The U.S.C.C.B. 
has a section of its website dedicated to “Marriage and Family” that includes dozens 
of Bishops’ Letters, Church documents, FAQs, and other documents. See UNITED 
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Marriage and Family, 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/index.cfm (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2018). The Bishops also have a portal on Faithful Citizenship, which focuses 
on “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship” and includes a bulletin insert and 
parish guide, as well as links to other documents. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE 
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, http://www.u 
sccb.org/issues-and-action/faithful-citizenship/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
The “Human Life and Dignity” Portal includes links to Vatican statements on social 
justice, as well as other statements of principles, but has little designed to educate 
the laity about how to implement the social doctrine of the Church in their own lives. 
See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Human Life and Dignity, 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018). 
242 See Scott Berinato, To Stop Bad Behavior, Display a Virtuous Quote, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 34–35 (describing study in which subjects were less 
likely to ask colleagues to engage in unethical behavior if those colleagues had a 
quote about integrity in their email signatures). 
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More importantly, there are many aspects of the Church’s 
social teaching that are applicable to ordinary work.  The 
requirements of caritas are personal, which is to say, they apply 
in person-to-person interactions.  An employee cannot spend her 
employer’s resources on socially desirable but more expensive 
supplies, but she can support her co-workers in difficulty, she can 
treat customers—including immigrants and “undesirables”—with 
courtesy and kindness, and she can mediate workplace disputes 
and step away from petty jealousies.  She can, moreover, provide 
opportunities for her co-workers and subordinates to have 
greater participation in their workplaces and to have more 
meaningful work experiences.243  These are small steps to 
advancing authentic human dignity, and thus are real ways that 
real people can advance social justice.244 
Many proponents of corporate social responsibility might 
question the relevance of this kind of daily ethics to CSR.  There 
are three answers to that question.  First, the Church’s social 
doctrine does not demand reform as an end in itself.  The Church 
is in the business of promoting caritas, not social programs.245  
Second, a large-scale conversion to caritas would go a long way to 
accomplishing social justice.246  Third, it has been argued that 
individuals working for corporations are less likely to make 
moral decisions,247 and that mid-level and low-level employees 
are particularly likely to engage in illegal or undesirable 
behavior.248  If those arguments are true, then focusing on  
 
 
243 See H.B. ACTON, THE MORALS OF MARKETS AND RELATED ESSAYS 23, 49 
(David Gordon & Jeremy Shearmur, eds. 1993) (“[T]his does not mean that even the 
Christian virtues must be absent from the business world altogether. Between the 
members of a firm or between its employees there is plenty of scope for humility and 
charity, and perhaps even for self-sacrifice as well.”). 
244 See BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SPE SALVI ¶ 48 (2007) [hereinafter 
SPE SALVI] (“As Christians we should . . . ask: what can I do in order that others 
may be saved . . . ?). 
245 See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 199. Pope Francis made this 
point in one of his first public statements as Pope. See FRANCIS, HOMILY MISSA PRO 
ECCLESIA (2013) (“We can walk as much as we want, we can build many things, but 
if we do not profess Jesus Christ, things go wrong. We may become a charitable 
NGO, but not the Church, the Bride of the Lord.”). 
246 See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” ¶¶ 3, 15 (1984). 
247 Coffee, Jr., supra note 123, 389–90, 392–93, 395–96, 398. 
248 Id. at 397. 
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ordinary workers might have more of an effect on the social 
behavior of corporations than additional exhortations directed 
toward top management.249 
B. Ownership of Property 
As noted above, Catholic social doctrine calls for the payment 
of just wages, promotion of global human development, 
protection of the environment, and respect for human life, among 
other things—in other words, social responsibility.  While a 
corporate employee is not permitted, consistent with her duty of 
loyalty, to undertake those initiatives sua sponte at work—that 
is, with her employer’s property—she is permitted, and even 
required, to consider those goals in her use of her own property. 
1. Use of Property as a Consumer 
It is probably safe to say that every American over the age of 
twelve has made a decision as a consumer.250  Those decisions 
involve a moral act,251 not only in the choices of how much to 
spend and what to spend it on,252 but also in the choice of from 
whom to purchase.253  From the perspective of the Church’s social 
 
249 There are numerous resources calling, or recalling, top managers to bear 
witness in their lives. See, e.g., HELEN J. ALFORD, O.P., & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, 
MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE 
MODERN ORGANIZATION (2001); PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, 
VOCATION OF THE BUSINESS LEADER: A REFLECTION (2012); BUSINESS, 
RELIGION, & SPIRITUALITY: A NEW SYNTHESIS (Oliver F. Williams ed. 2003); 
LAURA L. NASH, BELIEVERS IN BUSINESS (1994). There are also a variety of 
organizations devoted to supporting Christian managers. See, e.g., Fellowship of 
Companies for Christ International, http://www.fcci.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018); 
International Christian Chamber of Commerce, http://iccc.net/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018); Ask Wise Counsel, http://www.askwisecounsel.com/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018); C12 GROUP, http://www.c12group.com/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (for 
Christian CEOs and owners). But see Abellin, Oklahoma Publisher Prays with, Fires 
25 Workers, ABC NEWS (June 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/oklahoma-
company-fires-25-employees-amid-outsourcing-rumors/story?id=16520756. 
250 Average after-tax income per household in the United States in 2016 was 
about $64,000, and average annual expenditures were over $57,000. U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY (2016), tbl.1300, https://www. 
bls.gov/cex/2016/combined/age.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
251 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra 
note 128, ¶ 36. 
252 Cf. SPE SALVI, supra note 244, ¶ 39 (“[W]e need witnesses . . . if we are to 
prefer goodness to comfort, even in the little choices we face each day.”). 
253 See Gerald J. Beyer, Workers’ Rights and Socially Responsible Investment in 
the Catholic Tradition: A Case Study, 10 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 117, 142 n.103 
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doctrine—as opposed to Christian teaching generally—the 
relevant issue in both spending and saving is the practices of the 
businesses involved.254  For example, one can purchase only fair 
trade coffee or prefer brand-name Tylenol, manufactured by a 
company that purports to operate according to a socially 
responsible “credo,”255 to generic acetaminophen.  The point of 
making such consumer decisions is not to change the behavior of 
sellers or manufacturers,256 but rather to operate one’s own 
business—that is, purchasing—in accordance with one’s moral 
views and Church teaching. 
There are severe practical constraints on consumers trying 
to make moral choices when purchasing goods.  The first is the 
lack of a meaningful choice of items.  Recycled products and fair 
trade coffee are more expensive than their unsustainable 
counterparts, and many Americans cannot afford to make those 
choices.257  It might be difficult to find any ready-made clothing 
untouched by unfair or unsafe labor practices, no matter how 
much one is willing to spend.  The second problem is a lack of 
information.258  Most purchasing decisions must be made in the 
absence of reliable information about the producers of the goods 
or services being purchased.  We cannot trace the food we buy to 
the domestic producer who has given us salmonella, much less 
determine what labor practices are being used by the vendor’s 
sub-sub-contractor in Asia.  And manufacturing is only one 
step—where and how was the cotton grown and spun or the 
acrylic fiber produced?259  However, the literature on corporate 
 
(2013); and Kaveny, supra note 218, at 286 (discussing moral responsibility for 
purchasing decisions). 
254 Cf. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2504 (2d. ed 1997) (“Those who 
hold goods for use and consumption should use them with moderation, reserving the 
better part for guests, for the sick and the poor.”). 
255 See Our Credo, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
256 Cf. Elhauge, supra note 81, at 750–51 (arguing that consumer activists are 
acting for social and moral reasons but are unlikely to change corporate behavior). 
257 The fact that one cannot afford recycled products on one’s meager salary does 
not, of course, justify using someone else’s money to pay for them. Cf. Benjamin 
Harrison (attributed): “I pity the man who wants a coat so cheap that the man or 
woman who produces the cloth will starve in the process.” 
258 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; Elhauge, supra note 81, at 
750. 
259 Various disclosure systems relating to labor conditions and environmental 
practices have been proposed. See, e.g., David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: 
Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure 
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social responsibility presumes that one can identify corporations 
that are not engaging in socially responsible practices.  If that is 
so, consumers who spend their own money in ways that are 
contrary to relevant moral principles are engaging in socially 
irresponsible private behavior. 
2. Use of Property as a Business Owner or Investor 
With money that has not been spent, one may start one’s 
own business or invest in someone else’s.260  One purpose of 
investing is to provide for one’s future needs or to provide for 
future legitimate needs of others.  One might also invest in order 
to accumulate the funds necessary to start a socially responsible 
business.  Investing simply to accumulate wealth for oneself or 
one’s heirs and devisees would not be consistent with Catholic 
social doctrine, wherever the money were invested.  In addition, 
an inordinate desire for financial security can lead one to 
withhold resources that might be used to alleviate real 
suffering.261  Catholic social teaching and the universal 
destination of goods suggest that rates of return should be only 
one investment consideration among many.262  For one thing, a 
rate of return may entail a level of risk that is incompatible with 
legitimate reasons for investing.263  More importantly, an 
investor is, in a sense, the owner of a business,264 and if she is 
 
Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 353 (2005); John Parkinson, Disclosure and 
Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise 
in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 3, 5 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 
93, 95–96 (1998). 
260 This discussion assumes investments in corporate debt or equity, but other 
financial investments, including bank savings accounts and certificates of deposits, 
and even government securities, ultimately finance someone’s business. 
261 See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 494–95; see also EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra 
note 131, ¶ 80. 
262 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
FOR ALL ¶ 195 (1986), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 
572, 660–61. 
263 See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 504. 
264 I am not suggesting that investors own the businesses in which they invest 
in any legal sense; I mean only that they own their investment “business.” Also, 
from the perspective of the individual, an investment is a use of her property to 
participate in the economic benefits of a business, and thus makes her a participant 
in the business through her ownership of property. Many investors also participate 
as employees in the companies in which they invest. See Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 
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conducting that business with caritas, she will consider many 
other things besides her return on investment. 
Among other things, the Church teaches that the owner of a 
business265 must try to provide meaningful employment, pay a 
just wage, provide a work environment and benefits package that 
support the worker’s health and safety, provide an opportunity 
for her employees to participate in decision making in the 
business, provide adequate time for her employees to worship 
and spend with family, and otherwise promote the authentic 
development of her employees and possibly others by, perhaps, 
encouraging education or, for those so inclined, spiritual 
formation.266  She must, at a minimum, treat each of her 
employees and everyone else with respect, and, ideally, view each 
employee with caritas. 
The socially responsible business owner must charge a fair 
price for her goods or services and ensure that those goods and 
services are of high quality and are themselves things that 
promote authentic human development.  Consider the response 
of Professor Grisez when asked by the owner of an “upscale 
restaurant” whether he could consider an applicant’s appearance 
when hiring wait staff: 
You describe your restaurant as an expensive one patronized by 
the affluent, who, very likely, spend a good deal there on 
luxurious foods and fine wines.  In operating your business, you 
must promote and thereby intend that sort of consumption.  
Can you honestly judge that all of it, or at least enough of it to 
make your business profitable, is morally justifiable?  If not, you 
intend what is unjustifiable, and you need to repent and change 
the character of your business so that it will provide a truly 
needed, and so legitimate, service.267 
If one is suffused with caritas, all aspects of one’s business are 
considered from the perspective of human development.  What 
message does one’s advertising send?268  From whom does one 
purchase one’s supplies?  Does one’s supplier pay a just wage and 
 
FED. RES. BULL., June 2012, at 34 (reporting that 35.5% of households owning stock 
hold the stock of an employer). 
265 Business owners are a particular focus of the Church’s social doctrine. See 
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶¶ 344, 345. 
266 Id. ¶ 301. 
267 GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 494–95. 
268 See generally ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 249, at 178–92; Spoerl, supra 
note 30, at 284–85. 
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respect the rights of his employees?  Are one’s own and one’s 
suppliers’ business operations environmentally sustainable?  
Social responsibility requires that a business owner seek all 
these things. 
An investor provides funds so that someone else can operate 
a business.  An investor, like a business owner, must invest with 
caritas.269  Ideally, she would invest in businesses owned by other 
individuals with caritas, but those opportunities are likely to be 
scarce.  In the absence of that option, the faithful investor should 
seek to invest in businesses whose practices are consistent with 
Catholic social doctrine.  A socially responsible investor does not 
have the option to use her property to promote injustice or 
oppression, and she should avoid cooperation with such acts if 
possible.270  This is true not because the investor is morally 
responsible for the acts of the managers of the business, but 
because she is morally responsible for her own choices in using 
her assets.  An employee may be able to do her job even if she 
knows that the enterprise in which she works will commit a 
wrongful act, as long as she does not intend that act.271  A 
shareholder, on the other hand, who invests in order to share the 
profits of a business, necessarily intends the acts of the business 
that are taken to increase profits, and is therefore formally 
cooperating with any wrongful acts of the business.272  Investors 
who are concerned with social justice cannot invest in businesses 
that adhere to the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
The investor might also choose to use her investments to 
encourage the businesses in which she invests to improve their 
policies.  The investment policy of the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops (“U.S.C.C.B.”) includes “active corporate participation” to 
“support policies in accord with its values and oppose those in 
 
269 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 65; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra 
note 128, ¶ 36; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC 
JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 262, ¶ 354. 
270 See Beyer, supra note 253, at 142–43 (discussing cooperation and toleration 
of evil in connection with investment decisions). 
271 See supra notes 238–242 and accompanying text. 
272 See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 504–05. Investment in a mutual fund is more 
likely to involve material, rather than formal, cooperation because the investor 
likely intends that the portfolio produce a reasonable rate of return without 
intending the particular activities of the companies in the portfolio. See id. at 505–
06. Such material cooperation may be wrong also, depending on the circumstances. 
See id. at 506. 
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conflict with them.”273  The same goes for any investor, although 
an individual will have fewer opportunities to engage 
management in seeking corporate change.  Moreover, there are 
limits, under current law, to what shareholders are permitted to 
do.274  The kinds of policies that a socially responsible investor is 
likely to want to change will usually be within the discretion and 
control of the board.275  Abandoning sweatshops, adopting 
sustainable agricultural practices, and “promot[ing] generous 
wage and benefit policies and adequate worker safety 
guidelines”276 are all decisions within the business judgment of 
the board and are not subject to shareholder control.  If the 
investor cannot convince the board to adopt policies consistent 
with Catholic social teaching, the investor should invest 
elsewhere.277 
In recent years, more options for “socially responsible 
investment” have become available, but the Church warns that 
not all “social choice” funds are designed to encourage authentic 
human development.278  Some Catholic institutions, including the 
U.S.C.C.B., have developed investment policies that are 
expressly designed to comport with Catholic social doctrine;279 the 
complexity of their investment guidelines illustrates the 
difficulty of their task.280  Disclosure of CSR policies can help 
 
273 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SOCIALLY 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT GUIDELINES ¶ 3.2 (2003) [hereinafter INVESTMENT 
GUIDELINES]. The U.S.C.C.B. also notes that “mixed investments” in firms that do 
both good and bad may be “tolerated” as long as the U.S.C.C.B. engages in 
shareholder advocacy “with a reasonable hope of success for corporate change.” Id. 
274 See Jay B. Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder Bylaw 
Power, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 485, 490 (2013); Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note 
64, at 278–80. 
275 Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note 64, at 278–79. 
276 INVESTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 273, ¶ 4.1. 
277 See Beyer, supra note 253, at 143–44. 
278 See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 45; see also GRISEZ, supra note 
230, at 506; Mary Ellen Foley McGuire, Catholic Social Teaching Meets Wall Street: 
Do Good While Doing Well, AMERICA MAG. (Nov. 19, 2007), https://www.a 
mericamagazine.org/issue/634/article/catholic-social-teaching-meets-wall-street. 
279 See Beyer, supra note 253, at 141. 
280 But see Robert Milburn, Impact Investing Done Right, BARRON’S (Nov. 28, 
2015), http://www.barrons.com/articles/impact-investing-done-right-1448684226. 
Milburn notes, however, that even professional investors sometimes find themselves 
investing in businesses that do not share their social goals. Id. 
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guide socially responsible investors.281  Such information is 
increasingly available:  A recent review found that ninety-four of 
the Fortune 100 companies have CSR links on their websites,282 
and CEOs are sometimes explicit about their rejection of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.283  A high-profile 
example occurred at a 2014 Apple shareholders’ meeting.  When 
a “conservative think tank and investor” called for Apple to stop 
putting money in unprofitable green energy projects, Tim Cook 
replied, “If you want me to do things only for ROI [return on 
investment] reasons, you should get out of this stock.”284 
It is unclear whether socially responsible investing actually 
has any effect on the behavior of businesses,285 but that is not 
really the point.  The point is that the investor who cares about 
social justice must avoid participation in harmful activities.  
Commentators who argue that there is a moral duty to protect 
the common good must address their rhetoric to those who are 
able to act morally.  Moral outcomes can only be achieved by 
moral actors.  Moreover, if every Catholic dollar286 were 
withdrawn from socially irresponsible investments and 
redirected to businesses affirmatively engaged in socially 
beneficial activities, there would undoubtedly be a positive 
impact to those businesses,287 even if the irresponsible businesses 
were not induced to change their behavior.  And to the extent 
managers and commentators continue to espouse the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm, evidence that actual investors do not 
 
281 See Gabrielle Palmer, Note, Stockholder Inspection Rights and an 
“Incredible” Basis: Seeking Disclosure Related to Corporate Social Responsibility, 92 
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 134–35 (2015). 
282 The exceptions were: Berkshire Hathaway; Costco; Energy Transfer Equity; 
Enterprise Products Partners, an energy company; World Fuel Services; and INTL 
FCStone, an investment company. 
283 See GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 177 (quoting CFO of Herman Miller 
defending treatment of laid-off employees: “We think it’s the right thing to do. If you 
don’t like that, you can go invest somewhere else.”). 
284 Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, Apple’s Tim Cook: Business Isn’t Just About 
Making Profit, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 2, 2014, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/apples-tim-cook-
business-isn-t-just-about-making-a-profit-9163931.html. 
285 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1435–39 (2008) (arguing that socially responsible investing is not 
effective at changing corporate practices). 
286 See Milburn, supra note 280 (noting that by some estimates $6.57 trillion is 
engaged in “impact investing”). 
287 See id. 
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invest that way might cause them to reconsider their views.  
Most importantly, investor social responsibility involves 
individuals in decisions about the appropriate use of their own 
property, not someone else’s. 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
At the end of the day, social responsibility assumes a moral 
obligation to act in the best interests of the community.  It is not 
consistent with law or morality to encourage agents to use their 
principal’s assets to advance goals their principals do not share.  
It is consistent with both law and morality, however, to 
encourage principals—owners of their own property—to use their 
own assets to advance their own moral goals.  In fact, the social 
teaching of the Catholic Church requires it.  Encouraging 
disloyalty is unlikely to lead to better behavior by anyone in the 
long term, while enhancing individual moral responsibility may 
reduce the incidence of business wrongdoing—which is, of 
necessity, always carried out by individuals.  More 
fundamentally, there is a certain dissonance in calls for 
“corporate” responsibility, an oxymoron, that do not include calls 
for individual responsibility.  Every decision that an individual 
makes, whether at work, at the mall, or at the stockbroker’s, is a 
moral act.  Sacrificing profits in the public interest begins at 
home. 
 
